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THE OPEN-END ENCUMBRANCE
DONALD M. LESHER of the Denver Bar

Although in recent years a great deal has been written and
said about open-end mortgages or deed of trust,1 the concept of
an encumbrance given for a sum of money advanced at the time
of the execution thereof, or to be advanced in the future, or both,
is not new. Attorneys and lenders are perhaps less familiar with
the rights of the parties where a future advance encumbrance is
used than in the normal mortgage relationship, because the openend encumbrance is in less frequent use. Those rights, however,
appear to be well established in Colorado, as well as in other parts
of the country; the mystery appears to be one of unfamiliarity
more than anything else.
Since 1812, when the case of Shirras v. Caig, 7 Cranch. 34,
3 L.Ed. 260, was decided, the validity of such encumbrances has
been generally upheld. 2 Various decisions have resulted in confusion because of peculiar wording in the instrument involved in
the litigation; a few have followed the English theory that the
mortgagee, as legal title holder, has the right to retain title as
security. Occasionally jurisdictions have based their decisions on
local statutes,3 but even though the purpose is not so stated, it is
'For further discussion of this problem see Hiester, The Open End Mortgage, 28 DICTA 204 (1951) ; Ashley, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 31
N.C.L. REV. 504 (1953);

Smith, Open End Mortgages, 2 PORTLAND U. L. REV. 19

(1952) ; LIFE, July 27, 1953, p. 61 (a pictorial illustration) ; 29 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733 (1953).
'Jones v. N. Y. Guaranty Co., 101 U. S. 622; In re Rosenbatt, 299 Fed. 771;
Eggleston v. Birmingham Trust, 277 Fed. 1015; In re Corbett, 248 Fed. 988;
Thomas v. Blair, 208 Ala. 48, 93 S. 704; Hendon v. Morris, 110 Ala. 106, 20 S.
27; Patterson v. Ogles, 152 Ark. 395, 238 S. W. 598; Vogan v. Caminetti, 65
Calif. 438, 4 P. 435; Am. Say. Bank v. Kemp, 21 Calif. App. 571, 132 P. 617;
DuBois v. Denver First Ntl. Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908); Hubbard v.
Savage, 8 Conn. 215; Carrington v. Cit. Bank, 144 Ga. 52, 85 S. E. 1027; Weiser
L. & T. Co. v. Comberford, 238 P. 515; Freutel v. Schmits, 299 Ill. 320, 132 N.
E. 534; Good v. Woodruff, 208 Ill. App. 147; Bowen v. Ratcliff, 140 Ind. 393,
30 N. E. 860; Corn Belt Trust v. May, 197 Iowa 54, 196 N. W. 735; Allen v.
Fuget, 42 Kan. 672, 22 P. 725; Ky. Lum. Co. v. Ky. T. Say. Bank, 184 Ky. 244;
Merchants' Bank v. Hervey Plow, 14 S. 139; West. Nat. Bank v. Jenkins, 131
Md. 239, 101 A. 667; Taft v. Stoddard, 142 Mass. 545, 8 N. E. 586; Cit. Say. Bank
v. Kock, 117 Mich. 225, 75 N. W. 458; Madigan v. Mead, 31 Minn. 94, 16 N. W.
539; Foster v. Reynolds, 38 Mo. 553; Raymond Nat. Bank v. Rabke, 72 Mont.
527, 235 P. 327; Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720, 46 N. W. 286; Reed v. Rochford,
62 N. J. Eq. 186, 50 A. 70; Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43; Merchants'
State Bank v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238; Berry-Beall Co. v. Francis, 104 Okla. 81, 230
P. 496; Nicklin v. Betts Sp. Co., 11 Ore. 406, 230 P. 496; Moats v. Thompson,
289 Pa. 313, 129 A. 105; Ex parte Am. Fertilizer Co., 122 S. C. 171; Vacuum Oil
Co. v. Liberty Ref. Co., 265 S. W. 749; Segman v. Darrow, 31 Vt. 122; Eltopia
Fin. Co. v. Colby, 126 Wash. 554, 219 P. 24.
1New Hampshire has a statute (REV. ST. c. 131, §3) prohibiting optional
future advances, and has held mortgages providing for such advances are invalid. Staniels v. Whitcher, 72 N. H. 451, 57 A. 678.
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generally held that encumbrances for optional, additional advances
are valid, 4 even as against creditors and subsequent purchasers,
and even though the amount be unlimited, 5 and that such an advancement creates a lien prior to any intervening lien of which
the original mortgagee had no actual notice.
As is commonly the case, the rule of law is more readily stated
than applied. To arrive at a practical application of the general
rule of law, terminology must be defined; the rights (if other persons-the trustee, the intervening lien owner-must be considered;
the lender is entitled to advice from his attorney which will prevent litigation and which will, at the same time, answer practical,
competitve problems in a business-like manner.
The open-end encumbrance is becoming more and more common, not only in the financing of construction, 6 but also in the indemnifying of prospective endorsements, guarantees, and accommodations of commercial paper, 7 as well as in the financing of improvement and maintenance repairs and construction of residential property. Through the device of the open-end encumbrance, the mortgagee has the advantage of extending additional credit as the
value of the security increases, and of maintaining an additional
outlet for available funds without the necessity of the expenses
incident to additional loans. 8 The mortgagor has the obvious advantage of obtaining additional funds at low interest rates and
under long-term amortization schedules. In addition, the mortgagor avoids problems resulting from frequent title examinations,
refinancing, or the alternative of second or third mortgages. 9 By
means of the open-end encumbrance, additional moneys may be
advanced by the mortgagee, to be secured by the original encumIDubois v. First NatI. Bank, 43 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908); Dummer v.
Smedley, 110 Mich. 466, 68 N. W. 260; Reeves v. Evans, 34 A. 477 (N. J. Eq.).
See also: Ferguson v. Mueller, 115 Colo. 139, 169 P. (2d) 610 (1946) ; and 1
Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed. Sec. 461).
'United States v. Hoos, 3 Cranch 73; Thomas v. Blair, 208 Ala. 48; Hamilton v. Rhodes, 72 Ark. 625; Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Calif. 383, 19 P. 641; Davis
v. Carlisle, 5 Ind. Terr. 83; Union State Bank v. Chapman, 124 Kan. 315;
Bunker v. Barron, 93 Mo. 87; Cit. Say. Bank v. Rock, 117 Mich. 225; Candler
v. Cromwell, 101 Miss. 161, 57 S. 554; Rice Bros. v. Davis, 99 Mo. App. 636,
74 S. W. 431; Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720, 46 N. W. 286; Chartz v. Cardelli,
(Nev.) 270 P. 761; First Nat. Bank v. Byard, 26 N. J. Eq. 255; Cooan v. Bosque
Bonita Land Co., (N. M.) 42 P. 77; Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380; Paschal
v. Bohannan, 59 Okla. 139, 158 P. 365; Moats v. Thompson, 283 Pa. 313, 129 A.
105; Ex Parte Am. Fertilizer Co., 122 S. C. 171; Klein v. Glass, 53 Tex. 37;
Lamoille County Sav. Bank v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535; Alexandria Sav. Inst. v.
Thomas, (Va.) 29 Gratt 483; Carey v. Herrick, 146 Wash. 283, 263 P. 190.
'New Baltimore Loan & Savings Ass'n v. Tracey, 142 Md. 211, 120 A. 441
(1923); Tripp v. Babcock, 195 Mass. 1, 80 N. E. 593 (1907).
'Robinson v. Williams, 22 N. Y. 380 (1860).
'An informative series of articles discussing the advantages and procedures
involved in open-end mortgages was published intermittently in House &
Home, July, 1952-Dec., 1953.
965 HARV. LAW REV. 478 (1952).
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brance, as the need arises, as the parties agree, or in accordance
with original commitments.
These encumbrances have generally been classified as either
optional or obligatory. An obligatory open-end encumbrance is
one under which the mortgagee has agreed in advance to loan the
additional funds or one under which the mortgagee can elect to
make an advancement or an expenditure upon the security property without the conse'at or approval of the mortgagor. In the
latter group will fall such advancements as the payment of taxes,
maintenance of the security to prevent waste, and the like. In
the former group will be the customary construction loan, under
the terms of which the mortgagee agrees, at the time of the orikinal instrument, to advance the sums of money, within the limits
specified in said instrument, as the construction progresses.
There is little or no doubt concerning the priority of the lien
resulting from each advancement under an obligatory open-end
encumbrance. It is, almost without question, held that such lien
relates back to the lien of the original encumbrance, even though
other liens have intervened and the mortgagor has knowledge 6f
such intervening lien.' 0
A large portion of the texts and legal publication articles on
the subject have concerned themselves with the priority of the
lien of these obligatory open-end encumbrances and have paid little or no attention to the priority of liens for advancements made
under optional open-end encumbrances. The most acute problems,
however, exist in the use of optional open-end encumbrances.
If an encumbrance on its face purports to secure not only the
sum originally advanced but also additional amounts, with or without limit, as may be agreed upon by both parties from time tb
time in the future, does such an encumbrance or an advance made
thereunder create a valid lien? What is the priority of such lienor liens? What is the effect of such an instrument on third parties
claiming subsequent liens? Is the original mortgagee protected?
Can the intervening lienor protect his rights? Upon whom is
placed the obligation-the original mortgagee or the intervening
lienor-to give notice of additional money advancements? What
are the duties of the trustee upon release of the encumbrance, or
upon foreclosure?
".New Orleans Bank Assn. v. LeBreton, 120 U. S. 765; Schiffer v. Feagin,
51 Ala. 335; Keese v. Boardsley, 190 Calif. 465, 213 P. 500; Weissman v. Volimo,
84 Conn. 326, 80 A. 81; Good v. Woodruff, 208 Ill. App. 147; Belle Plaine Bank
v. May, 197 Iowa 54, 196 N. W. 735; Nelson v. Royce, (Ky.) 7 J. J. Marsh 401,
23 Am. Dec. 411; Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494; Gerrity v. Wareham Bank,
202 Mass. 156; Erickson v. Ireland, 134 Minn. 156; Sumers v. Roos, 42 Miss.
749; Creigh v. Jones, 103 Neb. 706; Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. Eq. 87; Hyman
v. Hauff, 138 N. Y. 48; Land Title Co. v. Shoemaker, 257 Pa. 213; Smith v.
Smith, 33 S. C. 210; Colquhoun v. Atkinson, 20 Va. 550; McCarty v. Chalfant,
14 W. Va. 531; Wis. Planing Mill Co. v. Schuda, 72 Wis. 277; In re O'Byrne,
L. R. 15 Ir. 373; Pierce v. Canada Co., 25 Ont. 671.
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Such an encumbrance, where moneys beyond, or in addition
to, the amount of the original indebtedness (less amortization payments) may be secured, if and when such moneys are advanced,
is an optional open-end encumbrance." The. amount of the advancements may be limited by the original instrument or no limit
whatsoever may be expressed.' 2 Advancements may be evidenced
by additional notes or other instruments, or appropriate wording
in the original note may include such advancements. 13 The advancements may result in a total indebtedness far in excess of
that stated in the original note, or such advancements may be lim14
ited by agreement, or otherwise, to the original indebtedness.
If the mortgagee has bound himself in advance by agreement
to lend future sums, or if the mortgagee can elect to make an
advancement or an expenditure upon the security property without the consent or the approval of the mortgagor, it is not an
optional advance . . . but is an obligatory advance. The optional
open-end encumbrance is most commonly in use in residential
financing because of its adaptability to the needs of the homeowner who makes conscientious efforts to maintain and increase
the value of his property. 15
Although some question may be raised as to the negotiability
of the promissory note which permits additional advances under
the original instrument, there can be no question that such a note
would be at least transferable.
Three Colorado cases seem to express the prevailing law as
to the validity of the open-end encumbrance and as to the priority
of the lien of the additional advance.
In Fergusonv. Mueller, 115 Colo. 139, 169 P. (2d) 610 (1946),
the Court said:
No question is made concerning the validity of the
mortgage to cover future advances and it is now well settled that the mortgage need not state on its face that such
was its purpose.
In the early Colorado case of Joralmon v. McFee, 31 Colo. 26,
"138 A. L. R_ 579.
"81 A. L. R. 631.
"3The following wording in the original note appears to be sufficient:
For value received, we promise to pay to the order of ............................
and such additional sums as may be advanced
the sum of $ ................
hereunder, at the option of the holders hereof, to the makers or their
successors in title.
11Connecticut has held that mortgages for unlimited future advances are
invalid as to creditors. Pettibone v. Griswold, 4 Conn. 158; Welch v. Chaffee,
73 Conn. 318.
" Where advances are to be made only to a certain amount or within a certain period, loans in excess of the amount or after expiration of the period are
not entitled to priority. When the advances are an obligation on the mortgages,
the mortgage takes effect immediately upon its execution. Atkinson v. Foote,
44 Cal. App. 149; Kohn v. Southern Ohio Loan and Trust Co., 101 Ohio 34;
In re Moroney's Appeal, 24 Pa. St. 372.
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71 P. 419 (1903), the Court upheld the validity of open-end encumbrances, and in DuBois v. First National Bank, 43 Colo. 400,
96 P. 169 (1908), the Court had before it the question of the
priority of an advance made under an open-end encumbrance over
an intervening good faith purchaser. The Court adopted the theory
of the law advanced by the mortgagee, which was stated as follows:
The position of the bank is that until she (the intervening good faith purchaser) gave to it actual notice of
the acquisition of her interest in the property, it might
continue to make advances to the mortgagor even after
the maturity of the mortgage notes, since the mortgage
did not restrict the time within which the advances were
to be made, which would be protected by the mortgage as
to the entire property.
and found that all the advances which the bank made to DuBois
were made before defendant gave notice of her rights, and were,
therefore, prior to such rights.
It would seem, therefore, that, in Colorado, optional advances
made under an open-end encumbrance are within the lien of the
original encumbrance if, at the time of such advance, the mortgagee had no actual notice of the intervention of other liens or
claimants.
The DuBois case, never having been overruled, remains as
the present law on the priority of the lien of advances made under
optional open-end encumbrances. The lien of such advance relates
back to the time of the original encumbrance, unless intervening
lienors or claimants6 have given notice to the mortgagee of their
intervening rights.1
The recording acts are meant to give reasonable notice to
subsequent creditors and purchasers concerning the credits which
have been or may be advanced and the purpose of or security for
the contract. The Mississippi case of Witczinski v. Everman 17 is
representative of opinions which state that even though no upper
limit is stated in the mortgage, the fact of recordation itself puts
subsequent parties on inquiry as to the state of dealings between
the parties. Although there is some authority for the premise
that the recording of a subsequent encumbrance puts the original
"e Davis v. Carlisle, 142 Fed. 196; Reidy v. Collins, 26 P. (2d) 712; Boswell
v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74; Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 Ill. 367; Brinkmeyer v.
Browneller, 55 Ind. 487; Nelson v. Boyce, (Ky.) 7 J. J. Marsh 401; Gray v.
McClellan, 214 Mass. 92; Finlayson v. Crooks, 47 Minn. 74; Chartz v. Cardelli,
(Nev.) 271 P. 761; Peaslee v. Evans, (N. H.) 132 A. 448; Micele v. Falduti,
(N. J.) 137 A. 92; Catskill Nat. Bank v. Saxe, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 82; U. S. Nat.
Bank v. Embody, (Ore.) 25 P. (2d) 149; Nat. Bank v. Gunhouse, 17 S. C. 489;
McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 4; Alexandria Say. Inst. v. Thomas, 29 Gratt (70
Va.) 483; Cisco Banking Co. v. Keystone Pipe Co., (Tex.) 277 S. W. 1060; Eltopia Fin. Co. v. Colby, 126 Wash. 554; Hall v. Williamson Grocery Co., 69
W. Va. 671.
151 Miss. 841 (1876).
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mortgagee on notice of the rights of such intervening lienor, it
is generally held that recording the junior lien does not constitute notice to the mortgagee who advanced the sums under the
mortgage.1 8 The intervening lien must be recorded to have any
claim, but the recording act does not work upwards to priorrecorded liens.
A majority of the jurisdictions, as well as England, Canada,
and Ireland, have held that where the advance is optional the
intervening liens are not superior thereto unless the advance is
made with actual notice or knowledge of the intervening encumbrance. Constructive notice is not sufficient, in most jurisdictions,
to prevent the lien of the additional advance from relating back
to the priority of the original encumbrance. 19
Under date of April 28, 1954, the Public Trustee of the Cfty
and County of Denver has issued a statement of policy with reference to the releasing and foreclosing of open-end deeds of trust.
"SWitczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (1876); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v.
Dunn, 10 Wash. (2d) 29, 116 P. (2d) 253 (1941). 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §1199 (5th Ed., 1941):
When a mortgage to secure future advances reasonably states the
purposes for which it is given, its record is a constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers; they are thereby put upon an
inquiry to ascertain what advances or liabilities have been made or
incurred. The record of a subsequent mortgage or conveyance, or the
docketing Of a subsequent judgment, is not a constructive notice of its
existence to such prior mortgagee. The prior mortgage, therefore, duly
recorded, has a preference over subsequent recorded mortgages or conveyances, or subsequent docketed judgments, not only for advanced
previously made, but also for advances made after their recording or
docketing without notice thereof.
19The majority doctrine discussed above is further clarified and enlarged
upon by Leonard A. Jones, The Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional
Sales, (6th Ed., 1933), as follows:
Generally the amount intended to be advanced need not be stated,
provided it can be otherwise ascertained by the description. But even
where limitation is necessary in order to constitute a continuing security, which will not be affected by subsequent conveyances, a recorded
mortgage for an unlimited sum is notice to a subsequent encumbrancer
as to all sums advanced upon the mortgage before the subsequent lien
attaches. Moreover, the record of the subsequent mortgage is no notice
to such prior mortgagee, that any subsequent lien has attached. A
subsequent mortgagee can limit the credit that may be safely given
under the mortgage for future advances only by giving the holder of
it express notice of his lien, and a notice also that he must make no
future advances on the credit of that mortgage. The mortgage will
then stand as security for the real equitable claims of the mortgagee,
whether they existed at the date of the mortgage or arose afterward,
but prior to the receipt of such notice. If such mortgagee is not under
any obligation to make advances, and after notice of a subsequent
mortgage does make further advances, to the extent of such advances
the subsequent mortgagee has the right of precedence. But if such
mortgagee is under obligation to make the advances, he is entitled to
the security, whatever may be the encumbrances subsequently made
upon the property, and whether he has notice of them or not.
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Because the Public Trustee, by statute, is obligated to determine
that the entire indebtedness has been paid in full and because the
priority of the lien of advancements made under open-end encumbrances is dependent upon the knowledge and notice of the parties, 20 the Public Trustee does not feel that he should be placed
in a position of determining the rights acquired under an improperly worded open-end encumbrance. Accordingly, the Public
Trustee of the City and County of Denver has stated that he will
release any open-end deed of trust without requiring bond only
if the deed of trust shows on its face a method by which the public Trustee can determine with certainty, at the time the release
is requested, that the person, association, or corporation signing
the request is the holder of all obligations secured by the deed of
trust, including the original loan at the time of execution, and
all subsequent loans or advances, if any; or if the deed of trusf
contains on its face authorization to the Public Trustee to release
the deed of trust upon receipt of the original note, duly cancelled,
without inquiry concerning subsequent loans or advances.
The Public Trustee has suggested certain forms of deeds of
,trust which may be used as open-end encumbrances. Of these, the
following provision appears to be the simplest:
This deed of trust secures not only the indebtedness
evidenced by the promissory note above described, but
also any additional indebtedness that may hereafter be
incurred by the debtor, his or their heirs, executors, administrators, successors or assigns, to the beneficiary;
provided, however, if the debtor, his heirs, executors,
administrators or assigns shall hereafter exhibit said
above described note, duly cancelled, to the public trustee with a written request for the release of this deed of
trust containing a statement that the entire indebtedness
secured hereby has been fully paid, the public trustee may
release this deed of trust without further showing as to
the additional indebtedness and without liability for so
doing.
The Public Trustee also has specifically approved the following
language:
And whereas, said note provides for additional advances at the option of the said Mortgagee, it is specifically agreed that said advances shall be a part of the principal indebtedness, that all of the covenants and agreements evidencing such advances shall be a part hereof,
and that this deed of trust shall secure, in addition to
"The Public Trustee of Denver has prepared a complete statement of
policy, as well as approved provisions to be used in open-end deeds of trust,
all of which are available on request.
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the original indebtedness, any additional advances made
by said Mortgagee to the makers or their successors in
title. The public trustee may, upon the production of said
note, duly cancelled, release this deed of trust without
further showing as to said additional advances and without liability for so doing; such release shall also constitute a release of the lien for any such advancements.
Although the above provisions have been approved by the
Denver Public Trustee, it is recommended that the specific provisions to be included in the encumbrance of any lender, if varying in substance from said provisions, be submitted to the Public
Trustee for his prior approval. Other forms have also been approved, any one of which may more adequately meet the needs
of the particular lender.
It is further suggested that, at the time of the release of an
open-end encumbrance, the request for release state as follows:
"Please execute this release; the indebtedness, together with all
additional advances, if any, secured by the above-mentioned deed
of trust, having been fully paid."
If the above-quoted phrases, or others approved by the Public
Trustee, are incorporated in open-end deeds of trust, no question
will be raised by the Public Trustee upon the release of said instrument. The Public Trustee has requested that all additional
advances be endorsed upon the original promissory note, or be
evidenced by additional agreements or notes. Such additional
notes, if any, must, of course, be surrendered to the Public Trustee
at the time of the release of the encumbrance.
Whether or not the abstract is to be recertified by the mortgagee at the time of making an additional advance is a matter
of business policy to be determined by the mortgagee. It is felt
that, as a practical matter, better practice would be for the mortgagee to take whatever steps may be necessary to determine the
existence of intervening lienors or title holders. In the event that
such intervening lien appears, the mortgagee can well insist that
the holder of such intervening lien execute a consent and subrogation agreement before the additional advancement is made.2 1 In
this manner, no question can be raised concerning the priority of
the lien of the additional advance. In the event, however, that
the additional advance is made without knowledge of such lien
or without the subrogation agreement I have referred to, it is recommended that the open-end encumbrances be foreclosed through
the courts rather than the Public Trustee, so that the rights of
all parties in the proceeds of the sale can be determined in advance,
in one proceeding.
"Where the intervening lien is expressly made subject to the mortgage
for future advances, it would seem to follow that the advances constitute a
prior lien, as was held in dicta of Menzies v. Lightfoot, L.R. 11 Eq. (England)
459.
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It has been suggested that legislation be adopted to clarify
the Colorado law concerning open-end encumbrances. In the opinion of the writer, such legislation is, at the present time, not necessary. The distinction between obligatory and optional open-end
encumbrances has been made certain by court decision. The rights
of the mortgagee under an optional open-end encumbrance are
well settled, and an intervening lienor can easily protect his rights
by ascertaining the total amount advanced under the prior encumbrance and by giving immediate actual notice to the mortgagee of his interest. It seems, therefore, that any statute would
only complicate an already well-established rule of law and would
afford no additional protection to any of the parties.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES
June 30-July 3, 1954, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Broadmoor Hotel
Honorable Phillip G. Gilliam, President, Presiding
Speakers will include Governor Dan Thornton, Judge William
McKesson of the Los Angeles Juvenile Court, and the Honorable
Mortimer Stone, Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Some of the topics to be discussed are:
1. The control of obscene literature and horror comics, now
being studied by the U. S. Senate Committee on Juvenile Delinquency.
2. Standards for specialized Courts dealing with children.
3. Newspaper publicity given to juveniles before the Court.
4. Young men entering the armed services with juvenile court
records.
5. Interstate Compact relating to runaway children.
6. Punishment of parents who contribute to the delinquency
of children.
7. The rights of children.
8. A review of the important judical decisions during the
past year.
Entertainment will include cocktail parties and scenic trips.
Further information regarding arrangements may be obtained
from Judge Charles J. Simon, El Paso County Court, Colorado
Springs, Colo.

